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The only public recognition that the outstanding mathematician and linguist H. Grass- 
mann ( 1809-1877) had among mathematicians in his lifetime was the award of the prize of 
the “Ftirstlich Jablonowskischen Gesellschaft” for his work of 1846, Geometrische Analyse 
gekniipft un die von Leibniz erfundene geometrische Charakteristik. In his book he develops 
ideas that Leibniz had expressed in a letter of September 1679 to Huygens concerning the 
establishment of a calculus directly applicable to geometric situations. Leibniz had criticized 
both Euclid and Descartes because of their purely constructive and synthetic approaches to 
geometrical questions. Leibniz sought to develop a genuine analytic method that on the one 
hand should be really universal and on the other should operate through specific geometrical 
relations rather than algebraic equations. J. Echeverrfa has criticized the now commonly 
accepted view that Grassmann’s Geometrische Analyse be legitimately seen as an extension 
of Leibniz’s ideas. This disagreement provides a new opportunity to present the issue within 
the framework of broader mathematical and philosophical concerns. What had in fact 
changed was that the ontological foundation of classical epistemology was no longer valid 
during the 19th century. The conviction that thinking directly understands being itself, no 
longer existed. Scientific thinking now either is committed to positivistic empiricism, or 
insists on the “theory ladenness” of observation as well as of intuition, while at the same 
time trying not to fall back into classical ontologism. &?J I989 Academic Press, Inc. 
Die einzige, ausdriickliche Anerkennung von mathematischer Seite erhielt Hermann 
Grassmann (1809-1877), der, wie wir heute sagen konnen, sowohl in der Sprachwissen- 
schaft wie in der Mathematik Aul3ergewohnliches geleistet hat, von der Fiirstlich 
Jablonowskischen Gesellschaft fur sein Werk “Geometrische Analyse gekniipft an die von 
Leibniz erfundene geometrische Charakteristik” im Rahmen einer Preisaufgabe dieser Ge- 
sellschaft zum angegebenen Thema. In diesem Werk entwickelt Grassmann Ideen zu einem 
mit den geometrischen Objekten direkt operierenden Kalktil, die auf Leibniz zurtickgehen. 
Leibniz war sowohl mit der euklidischen wie cartesischen Behandlung der Geometrie unzu- 
frieden und suchte einen Zeichenkalkiil, mit dessen Hilfe “die Analyse wirklich zu Ende 
gefiihrt werden konnte’ ’ . J. Echeverrfa hat ktirzlich als erster die allgemein akzeptierte 
Auffassung kritisiert, da8 Grassmanns Werk als legitime Entwicklung und Fortfiihrung der 
Leibnizschen Ideen betrachtet werden kann. Die dadurch aufgetretene Meinungsver- 
schiedenheit bietet eine willkommene Gelegenheit, die Problematik in ihrem weiteren 
mathematischen und philosophischen Kontext aufs neue zu analysieren. Tatsachlich ist 
Leibniz und Grassmann das Interesse an Fragen der Ontologie gemeinsam, und das grenzt 
sie beispielsweise gegemiber der vorherrschenden positivistischen Tradition des 18. und 19. 
* Paper presented at the conference “Science and the Enlightenment in Europe,” Edinburgh, 28-31 
August 1986. 
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Jahrhunderts ab. Aber die Fragen der Ontologie einer mathematischen oder physikalischen 
Theorie haben im 19. Jahrhundert eine ganzlich neue Form angenommen. CI 1989 Academic 
Press, Inc. 
Un prix de la Societe Jablonowski fut la seule reconnaissance officielle chez les scientifi- 
ques que recut le mathematicien et linguiste hors pair H. Grassmann (1809-1877) pour la 
sortie de son travail de 1846: “Geometrische Analyse geknupft an die von Leibniz erfundene 
geometrische Charakteristik”. Dans cet ouvrage, Grassmann developpait des idles emises 
par Leibniz dans une lettre a Huygens de septembre 1679 en ce qui concernait la mise en 
place d’un calcul directement applicable a la geometric. D’ailleurs, en d’autres occasions, 
Leibniz avait critique aussi bien Euclide que Descartes pour leur approche purement con- 
structive et synthetique des problemes geometriques. 11 cherchait une methode fonciere- 
ment analytique, de portee universelle et tout & la fois capable d’agir sur les relations 
specifiques geometriques plutot que par des equations algebriques. J. Echeverrfa a remis en 
cause l’opinion generalement acceptee aujourd’hui qui fait de la “Geometrische Analyse” 
de Grassmann une extension des idles leibniziennes. Ce d&accord nous offre l’opportunite 
de discuter le cas dans un contexte plus large, a la fois mathematique et philosophique. 11 
faut tenir compte du fait que le fondement ontologique de l’epistemologie classique avait 
perdu sa validite au XIXe siecle. On ne partageait plus la conviction d’une pensee allant 
directement a la r&&e. La pensee scientilique d’aujourd’hui si elle n’est pas soumise a 
l’empirisme positiviste, insiste alors sur l’organisation theorique des observations et de 
l’inttiition, cherchant simultanement a ne pas tomber dans l’ontologie classique. o 1989 
Academic Press, Inc. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In 1917 A. E. Heath expressed his views on an issue that has also attracted 
attention from Cassirer, Couturat, and Russell: “For the year 1845 (but extended 
to 1846 to coincide with the two hundredth anniversary of Leibniz’s birth) the 
Jablonowski Society of Leipzig set a prize essay demanding the restatement or 
further development of the geometrical calculus discovered by Leibniz or the 
setting up of a similar calculus; and the award was made to Grassmann for the 
essay, printed in 1847 . . . This was the first and the only acknowledgment of the 
value of his work which he received from mathematicians” [Heath 1917, 371. 
All the scholars mentioned above seem to agree that the more general aims of 
both Leibniz and Grassmann were the same: the setting up of a convenient calcu- 
lus or art of manipulating signs by fixed rules, and of deducing therefrom true 
propositions for the things represented by the signs for use as a generalized 
mathematics. In each case, their geometrical calculus was a particular application 
to geometry of a wider calculus. 
In a letter to Arnauld, dated January 14, 1688, Leibniz writes: “Some day, if I 
find leisure, I hope to write out my meditations upon the general characteristic or 
method of universal calculus, which should be of service in the other sciences as 
well as in mathematics. I have already some fine essays on the subject. I have 
definitions, axioms, and very remarkable theorems and problems in regard to 
coincidence, determination, similitude, relationship in general, power or cause of 
HM 16 THE IDEAS OF HERMANN GRASSMANN 3 
substance; and everywhere I proceed by letters in a precise and strict manner as in 
algebra. I have made some applications of it in jurisprudence” [Leibniz 1875-1890 
II, 1341. The idea of this calculus expresses Leibniz’s view that knowledge is but a 
property of form and that “it is form, which gives determinate being to matter,” 
as he had written to Amauld in a letter before the one mentioned. 
Similarly Grassmann says: “By the general science of forms (Formenlehre) we 
understand that body of truths which apply alike to every branch of mathematics, 
and which presuppose only the universal concepts of equality and difference, 
connection and disjunction” [ 1844, 331. Grassmann’s theory of extension, how- 
ever, is not just deduced from his general science of forms, but presupposes the 
intended application to real space as a contrasting and complementary “produc- 
tion factor.” The idea of space is thereby turned into a method of interpretation of 
mathematical thought. At the same time the abstract axiomatics of Grassmann’s 
general science of forms is made a vehicle for the investigation of the possibilities 
of mathematical thought connected with the idea of space. Space provided a base 
for the enlargement of the definitions of calculation (of addition and multiplica- 
tion) such that the field of “quantitative,” the subject matter of mathematics 
itself, was enlarged. 
How far can Grassmann be compared with Leibniz at all? In which sense could 
he be considered as somebody who modifies and possibly completes a Leibnizian 
program? Had not the historical situation changed fundamentally in the course of 
one and a half centuries, with regard to both mathematics and the broader so- 
ciohistorical context? Through questions like these, one is inevitably led to intro- 
duce philosophical arguments, in particular as both protagonists, Grassmann and 
Leibniz, placed their own work in a philosophical context. True, Grassmann was 
no philosopher, although his unusual “philosophical” style of mathematics has 
been the focus of much complaint. He was above all a self-taught mathematician 
and as a consequence of this, his views were nearer to the philosophically minded 
“Zeitgeist” than to the established mathematical circles. Accordingly, the history 
of philosophy will provide one of the coordinates, which should allow for a delimi- 
tation or possible relation between the ideas of both. Otherwise one would have to 
be satisfied in stating that mathematics had been growing to such a degree from 
the 17th or the beginning of the 18th to the 19th century that hardly any similarities 
would be strong enough to justify mentioning them. This note therefore necessar- 
ily has two aspects, a philosophical one alongside the mathematical. The essential 
proposal of this paper now is to connect these aspects, simultaneously gaining a 
basis for comparing Leibniz and Grassmann, by adopting the perspective of the 
problem of mathematization of external reality. 
“For Descartes, geometry was primarily the art of solving geometrical prob- 
lems, in particular construction problems” [Bos 1984, 3381. This was not true for 
either Leibniz or Grassmann. Both of them were concerned with knowledge as a 
whole, including questions of its foundations and its form. For Leibniz this 
“form” was constituted through proof, for Grassmann through conceptual con- 
struction and growth of theory. 
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Is not, however, ‘ ‘problem solving” the dynamical, developmental force of 
mathematics? This would fit in with Hacking’s statement: “Descartes was almost 
ingenuously radical . . . Leibniz, in contrast, was ingenuously conservative” 
[Hacking 1984, 221-j. With reference to this characterization, it could be said that 
Grassmann’s geometrical ideas represent a true combination of the approaches of 
Descartes and Leibniz. Also as a theoretician Grassmann shared the Cartesian 
boldness of firmly maintaining even against seeming likelihood the preeminence of 
rational knowledge, and his ideas were of startling originality and exceptional 
boldness in the realm of formal mathematical thinking. On the other hand he was, 
like Leibniz, very much concerned with the problem of establishing harmony 
between formal thought and physical reality. These observations should justify 
my proposal to compare Leibniz and Grassmann on the basis of a supposed 
connection between philosophical and logical ideas about mathematics on the one 
hand and conceptions of mathematization of external reality on the other. 
One might in fact observe two different trends in modern logic. On the one side 
logic was during the 19th century freed from the dominion of epistemology in the 
same manner as mathematics and science were freed from the guidance of philo- 
sophical or religious metaphysics and at the same time logic was supposed to 
establish a sort of critical instance with respect to mathematics in the same man- 
ner as Kant had established philosophy as a tribunal of pure reason. And in fact 
“the kind of philosophy which stems from Russell and Frege is, . . . simply one 
more attempt to put philosophy in the position which Kant wished it to have-that 
of judging other areas of culture on the basis of its special knowledge of the 
foundations of these areas” [Rorty 1980, 81. Russell, Frege, and Bolzano before 
them intended to found mathematics on logic, at the same time clearly distinguish- 
ing between the two. 
On the other hand there existed the tendency of developing logic as a part of 
mathematics, rather than the other way around. These intentions were more or 
less a consequence of the fundamental experience that questions of foundation 
and of development of knowledge are intertwined. Logic owed as much to algebra 
and geometry as these gained from the application of the general ideas and ab- 
stract regulatory principles of mathematical philosophy. This approach is not so 
much concerned with logical rigor of reasoning, but rather with the development 
of implicit axiomatic descriptions of various extralogical subject matter of mathe- 
matics. As Peano expressed it in 1923: “Mathematics has a place between logic 
and the experimental sciences” (quoted after [Lewis 1977, 1461). Grassmann 
certainly represents this kind of approach although he would have used the term 
“philosophy” instead of “logic.” As this concern for particular objects known 
imports differentiating and disintegrating effects into the notions of knowledge 
and theory, one has to face the problem of the relationship of the universal and the 
particular as a central one. Kant knew about this problem, but considering it a 
problem of relationship of two distinct sorts of “Vorstellungen,” concepts on the 
one hand and intuitions on the other, he transformed it into subject matter of a 
special discipline, namely, philosophical epistemology [ 11. 
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Another tendency of 19th-century epistemology consisted in viewing scientific 
theory as a reality sui generis and as autonomous in its movement. For classical 
rationalism the difference between perception and conception was one of degree; 
for Kant and post-Kantian epistemology it is one of kind. From this it follows that 
knowledge can never be established apodictically and even that, if one was inter- 
ested in theoretical meanings and not only in methods, one might be led to search 
to establish a theoretical ontology distinct from the empirical world but neverthe- 
less grasping the essential features of the latter. If, like Leibniz [Leibniz 187% 
1890 VII, 2191 and Grassmann [ 1844, 341, one sees the essence of the equation in 
substitutivity, this may fail in epistemic contexts. Even if u = b is true it does not 
follow that a and b are intersubstitutable. The problem is that the identity may not 
be known or knowable. Leibniz might, facing this problem, rely on God’s ability 
to perform the final analysis and base his methodological principles on God’s 
perfection. Grassmann would take the view that only the formal context of a 
theory as whole may be related to external reality and not just individual proposi- 
tions or concepts. The fundamental equations thus govern objects in models. 
Physical quantities do not represent the attributes common to phenomena, but 
those of the layer behind them. They represent an underlying reality, which can- 
not be grasped by unsophisticated sensation but requires conceptual mathematical 
activity. 
Most contemporaries favored an empirical epistemology, considering theoreti- 
cal laws to be shorthand representations of numerical approximations. Especially 
according to French-influenced science, formal relations had no meaning in them- 
selves, but rather in that they could be interpreted numerically. 
The analytical approach of Lagrange, Laplace, and other French scientists to 
physics was criticized in Germany by an older generation of representatives of a 
“science of the concrete,” as Kenneth Caneva has called them [Caneva 1974,4], 
and also by Grassmann [ 1844, 8-91 who was a member of the younger generation 
of “abstracting science.” Both generations stressed the importance of a comple- 
mentary synthetic element in physical methods in order to better do justice to the 
essential nature of the phenomena (in case of the “concretizing science”), or to 
the essential theoretical ideas, respectively. Their criticism and their desire for the 
synthetical is, however, to be judged as fundamentally different, because of the 
very different ontological commitments underlying the two approaches. 
Whereas the “science of the concrete” in Germany shared the empiricism of 
French analytical science, but objected to the extensive use of the analytical 
method of mathematical deduction from so-called “fundamental observations” 
(for a characterization of the method of the “rigor movement” of French science 
see [Israel 1981, 213f]), Grassmann, and others from the group of “abstracting 
science” [Caneva 1974, 131, differed fundamentally in that they did not believe in 
theoretically unaided experiences and observations and in that their main interest 
was synthetic generality of concept. They also adapted a hypothetico-deductive 
method which reversed the order of the relationship between theory on the one 
hand and experiment and observation on the other, from what it had been for 
6 MICHAEL OTTE HM 16 
German concretizing science and for the French analytical approach. By employ- 
ing the hypothetico-deductive method physics was among other things “freed 
from the old requirement that its basic explanatory principles be (ideally) immedi- 
ately demonstrable in experience” [Caneva 1974, 3031. 
Grassmann’s interest in a formal synthesis and his method of implicitly defining 
entities by axiomatically specifying the relations into which they enter is in con- 
trast to the “rigor movement” of French mathematical science, for which mean- 
ing and rigor resided in explicit numerical calculability, in roughly the same man- 
ner as the aforementioned two views with respect to the relationship between 
(mathematical) theory and (logical or philosophical) meta-theory differ from each 
other. The main finding is the proposition that different conceptions of mathemati- 
zation of the natural world led to just as different ideas about the foundations of 
mathematics. 
Giorgio Israel [Israel 19811 has recently refuted the thesis that had “established 
a close link between the rigor movement and the axiomatic movement, conceiving 
the latter as the achievement of the rigor movement,” and has argued that the 
rigor movement goes back to the conceptions of Cauchy, who initiated the pro- 
gram of arithmetization of analysis, refusing the generality and abstractness of 
axiomatization. This parallelism of views becomes even more clearly noticeable if 
one realizes that the one side in both cases (i.e., the search for absolute founda- 
tions and the rigor movement) tended to eliminate altogether reference to the 
objects known in its search for foundations of truth and objectivity of knowledge, 
and instead employed conceptions of uniform rigorous method. Empiricism tried 
to accomplish this by treating all areas of reality mathematically in the same 
manner. Mathematization was based on number and function alone. And logicism 
hoped in fact to show that mathematics does not have any subject matter. The 
other position, however, claims that differences of type of knowledge or certainty 
must correspond to differences of type of objects known 121. This does not mean 
to say that the object, which a proposition is about, imposes the truth of that 
proposition, in the sense of the paradigmatic case of the axioms of geometry in 
their traditional Euclidean understandings, but one would object to the view that 
rational certainty is just a matter of superior method or victory in argument rather 
than of relation to an object known. 
With respect to the origin of pure mathematics during the early 19th century, 
Scharlau has advanced the thesis that the “decisive condition . . . was the fact 
that for the first time in the history of mathematics a large number of connections 
were discovered between seemingly different problem areas and results” [Schar- 
lau 1981, 3391. This provided questions of mathematical existence with some 
importance and geometry played a certain role in this, as the debate about the 
nature of the so-called imaginary numbers and their relational interpretation by 
means of geometry shows. This debate may be related directly to Grassmann’s 
calculus of extension, as Gauss pointed out in 1844 in a letter to Grassmann 
[Grassmann 1862, 3971. 
It has repeatedly been claimed (see, for instance, [Boutroux 19201) that the ideal 
of mathematics whose foundations had been laid by Descartes and Leibniz began 
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to decline toward the end of the 18th century. This ideal considered mathematics 
or logic to be exclusively concerned with form: mathematics as the science of 
forms, and proceeding in a mechanical, quasi-automatized way through logico- 
algebraic synthesis. One could perhaps equally well claim that this ideal takes on a 
new character with the advent of pure mathematics, which is understood as 
dealing with formal and analytic truths in contrast to the factual truths of empirical 
science and mathematical applications. 
Should we not rather understand this ideal as an undercurrent in the historical 
development of mathematics up into our century? When Hilbert searched for a 
consistency proof of finitistic grounds, he, like Leibniz, took as unproblematic 
only those mathematical assertions whose truth or falsity could be determined by 
immediate perception of combinatorial facts. 
On the other hand after some time it became quite obvious that mathematical or 
logical analysis did not suffice to set up the axioms of any relevant mathematical 
theory, and that one had to abandon the thesis of uniquely determined axioms as 
absolute logical beginnings. In fact, already after the turn of the 18th century, it 
was somehow felt that one should distinguish between a mathematical concept 
and its definitions or formal expressions and should understand that “l’idee que 
nous en avons est plus riche et plus pleine que toutes les defmitions ou expres- 
sions que nous pouvons donner ou construire” [Boutroux 1920, 1671. Mathemat- 
ics could no more base its foundations on the definite results of absolute analysis 
or on direct experience. 
If one characterizes the evolution of modern scientific thought during the 2 
centuries after Kant, by stating that it consisted in a gradual change from an 
ontologic self-understanding toward a constructive one, and from a thinking 
guided by general and fundamental principles toward one of differentiation and 
distinction, then Grassmann’s theory of extension, presented as an unending 
construction, starting with just undifferentiated difference, may be acclaimed as a 
perfect expression of these trends of modern science. However, as was said 
already, there are also other more “conservative” elements in his theorizing, for 
instance, his deep ontological commitments. If one were to describe Grassmann’s 
ideas of mathematics and science by one particular expression, one would have to 
state that these ideas are characterized by a sense for contrasts, which recognizes 
these as fundamental and at the same time as fluid. For instance, the objects of 
mathematics for Grassmann were no longer the traditional (discrete or continu- 
ous) quantities but rather two contrasts: the contrast of the discrete and the 
continuous which signifies just the method of generation, the way the objects 
come into being, and the contrast between the objects themselves, their qualities, 
grasped only according to difference and similarity. The objects of mathematics 
thus consisted of a formal and an historical and genetical aspect [3]. 
2. ANCESTORS, ANTECEDENTS, AND “ZEITGEIST” 
Hermann Grassmann was strongly influenced by his father Justus Grassmann 
(1779-1852) [Lewis 19811, who in turn, being almost a contemporary of Schelling 
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(1775-1854), shared some of the philosophical ideas of Romantic “Naturphilo- 
Sophie” of early 19th-century Germany [4]. Criticizing Kant from a “holistic” 
point of view, these philosophers tried to revive certain elements of Leibniz’s 
philosophy, although with appropriate modifications. Kant had stated that philos- 
ophy and mathematics were not to be distinguished in their material or objects but 
rather with respect to method. In his Critique of Pure Reason, he wrote: “Philo- 
sophical knowledge is the knowledge gained by reason from concepts; mathemati- 
cal knowledge is the knowledge gained by reason from the construction of con- 
cepts. To construct a concept means to exhibit a priori the intuition which 
corresponds to the concept” [Kant 1781, 6131. In other words, mathematical 
knowledge is formal in that constructing an idea means presenting it in its given 
context and does not mean explaining a complex by reducing it to another com- 
plex. And when we call mathematical construction “synthetic,” we have to be 
aware of the Kantian distinction between pure and empirical intuition (An- 
schauung), and have to realize that mathematical constructivity is founded also on 
pure intuition and not on empirical intuition alone. 
Kant also develops this distinction: ‘ ‘Philosophical knowledge considers the 
particular only in the universal, mathematical knowledge the universal in the 
particular, in fact one by one, yet at the same time a priori and by means of 
reason. As a result, the particular is determined under certain general conditions, 
for the construction as well as the object of the concept must be seen to be 
universally determined. This is the essential difference between the two types of 
knowledge, and not their material content or subject matter” [Kant 1781, 6141. 
The difference in objects (quantity being the object of mathematics and quality 
that of philosophy) follows from this difference in method, for only the concept of 
quantity can be constructed. 
Whoever was of the opinion that the traditional characterization of the objects 
of mathematics was not sufficient (Leibniz, as well as Grassmann, wanted to see 
differences in quality also expressed mathematically), or objected to the sharp 
distinction between philosophy and mathematics, had to challenge the Kantian 
distinction of the methods of both fields, as well as Kant’s assertion that qualities 
(the objects of philosophy) “cannot be presented in any intuition that is not 
empirical. ’ ’ 
This was done, for instance, by Schelling and Hegel in their Kritisches Journal 
of 1802/1803. Kant’s distinction is useless, Schelling said, as both ways of pro- 
ceeding are present in mathematics, geometry being forced to present the general 
through the particular and arithmetics, on the contrary, giving the particular as a 
general only. Instead, the real difference, according to Schelling, lies in the fact 
that only philosophy is constructive activity without further presuppositions, 
whereas mathematics, like any other singular science, is founded through philoso- 
phy and is in itself forced to start with assumptions which it cannot construct by 
itself but has to adopt from philosophical construction. Schelling considers mathe- 
matics to be nearest to philosophy because of its constructivity, its determinate 
mode of generation. Construction or constructivity is defined to be “the represen- 
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tation of the general and particular as a unity” [Schelling 1802, 361, and is not just 
determined by the epistemic subject (as in Kant’s philosophy) but reflects reality 
as such. 
As Schelling notes, this construction is the equivalence of the concept and 
intuition as Kant had already conceived it. In that Kant, however, does not see 
the consequent unity of the general and the particular, he falls back, as far as 
mathematics is concerned, to the level of a dichotomy of abstract concepts vs. 
empirical intuition, while Leibniz’s idea of a universal characteristic already 
shows that it is constructiveness that is meant [Schelling 1802, 2051. The equiva- 
lence of those fundamental contrasts like concepts vs. intuition, analysis vs. syn- 
thesis, reflection vs. construction can be understood only in terms of an infinite 
constructive production process. As stated, it is exactly the difference between 
arithmetic and algebra on the one hand and geometry on the other that shows that 
the elements of this process are present in mathematics itself, and, as a conse- 
quence of this, also “all the oppositions, that are made possible by the contrast of 
the general and particular” [Schelling 1802, 2061. 
Although it may be true that before Kant an inquiry into the nature and origin of 
knowledge had been a search for privileged representations, and that with Kant it 
became a search for the rules that were to enable the mind to generate objective 
knowledge, Kant himself had, according to Schelling, not realized that both these 
two endeavors were present in mathematics, demonstrated by the differences 
between geometry and arithmetics. 
What is important here is to emphasize that mathematics must necessarily no 
longer be satisfied with constructing triangles and the like, but has to construct 
more fundamental concepts, like the notion of equality or the concept of space 
[Schelling 1802, 2071, and for that it needs a philosophical overview in addition to 
calculation and empirical construction. The view that the notion of (mental) con- 
struction has to be objectified, along with the idea that the subject matter of 
mathematics must be extended, and based on the unity of the general and the 
particular realized through the construction, were also held by Grassmann. Schel- 
ling had already reduced this to a formula by defining nature “as something 
simultaneously autonomous and also determined by the I.” In this context, it 
should be pointed out again that it was held true that “natural philosophy is as 
such the whole and undivided philosophy, and to the extent that nature is the 
objective knowledge, the whole of philosophy can be called natural philosophy 
from a theoretical perspective” [Schelling & Hegel 1802-1803, 1851. Similarly, 
mathematics and natural science are only “one and the same science viewed from 
different sides” [Schelling 1802, 371. 
Although I do not intend to describe exhaustively Romantic Nuturphdosophie, 
I should like to summarize its essential characteristics in two points that are of 
importance for the argument of this paper. Nuturphdosophie shows first a desire 
for synthetic generality of conceptualization. It relies on constructivity of reason 
to discover basic truths about the world through combinatorial synthesis. Kant 
made activity the basis of knowledge, thereby providing synthesis with greater 
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epistemic significance than it had had before. Substantiation of knowledge is 
according to Kant possible only through correlation with the activity of the Tran- 
scendental Subject, and synthesis therefore expresses subjective construction. 
For Romantic Naturphdosophie as well as for 17th-century rationalism, synthesis 
is in the end objectively determined and is a process of revealing the universal 
connections that exist. “The combination of two elements is the element com- 
pletely determined by the two,” writes Hermann Grassmann [1844, 2211. Every- 
thing can be made subject matter of combinatorial construction in exactly the way 
Leibniz had dreamed of because everything is connected and these connections 
may be unveiled through the process of construction. 
A second complex of characteristic features may be bundled up by the term 
“historicity.” As awareness with respect to the overall historical situation of 
man’s epistemological concerns has to incorporate all forms and types of human 
existence, the historical orientation combined with the constructivist impetus led 
to decidedly antireductionist attitudes. Hierarchies of different levels and forms of 
cognition and knowledge, not reducible onto one another, were postulated. Leib- 
niz had tried to harmonize oppositions not only by assuming a preestablished 
harmony based on a parallelism of form between the mental and the external 
worlds, but also by deducing that all differences of levels or type are of degree and 
not of kind. Romantic Naturphilosophie accepted such a preestablished harmony 
only as far as it could be stated as expressing the basics of a developmental or 
constructive process, not as a property of the world given as such. German 
Romantic Naturphdosophie including Schelling’s development of Kant’s “dyna- 
mism,” as opposed to the “materialist” views of French scientists, supported 
very much exploratory work in fields not reducible to mechanics, like electricity 
and thermodynamics. The discovery of the conservation of energy by Robert 
Mayer, for instance, owes something to the Romantic philosophy as a comparison 
of the styles of Mayer and H. Grassmann already suggests. 
Justus Grassmann taught at the Stettin Gymnasium from 1806 to 1852 when his 
son, Hermann, succeeded him as head of mathematics. For Justus Grassmann, 
the educational context was not just significant because of his position, but he was 
also convinced that no educational “work is of solid value if it is not at the same 
time . . . able to claim scientific recognition” [1829, xiv]. Hence he published a 
series of small books between 1817 and 1835 in which he wanted to expound a new 
philosophical and educational conception of mathematics while at the same time 
developing mathematics itself. J. Grassmann defines mathematics as synthetic 
constructivity, as a construction which does not start from any content or empiri- 
cal intuition, but solely considers things according to the principle of noticing their 
equality or difference. Logic, J. Grassmann says, abstracts from content, thereby 
presupposing there is one. Mathematics is strictly formal construction without 
any question of content [J. Grassmann 1827, 31. Intuition is the result of mathe- 
matical activity, not its starting point. This reverses the order of the relationship 
between theory and experience as compared to the inductivist ideal of empiricism, 
and introduces “theory ladenness” of observation and experimentation [Schelling 
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1802,961. On the other hand, mathematics cannot develop any objectivity without 
formal coherence and application to nature. 
For Justus Grassmann, mathematics is the science of the synthesis according to 
external relations, that is, according to difference or identity [J. Grassmann 18 17, 
41. As he regards the contrast of equal and unequal to be relative, he gains a 
division of mathematics according to “which of both elements serves as the 
determination that underlies the synthesis, while both are continually present” 
[1827, 51 in the theories of quantities and combination. “The synthesis of equals 
gives us the quantity,” while “the joining together as different results in the 
theories of combinatorics” [1827, 41. Justus Grassmann is particularly interested 
in this combinatory element of mathematics or in the “construction from differ- 
ences . ’ ’ He regards the theory of combinatorics, however, as underdeveloped and 
misused by the Hindenburg school, as it has yet to find the same application to 
nature as the theory of quantities, in other words, the synthesis of equals, in 
physics. He believes that “one day the theory of combinations will be of the same 
importance for natural history and chemistry as the theory of quantities is now for 
physics” [ 1827, 71. 
The relation between mathematics and the natural sciences addressed here also 
has a reverse side to the extent that mathematics cannot be developed as a simply 
synthetic construction without an empirical reference. As far as the combinatory 
synthesis is concerned, “indeed, most of the combinatory developments, when 
extended, lead into great ramblings, and I consider it to be a major task to find the 
most suitable limitations in order to avoid all such ramblings. In this however, the 
reference to the combinations of nature is generally of the most decisive utility 
and it restricts at least the randomness in any limitations,” which must of neces- 
sity be applied. To a certain extent, then it is the application of mathematics to 
nature that provides mathematics with its objective content and sets the necessary 
limitations. 
In the sense of this program, Justus Grassmann published an application of the 
theory of combinations to crystallography in 1829. In his concluding comments, 
he comprehensively clarifies his position [5]. First, he strives toward a totality of 
the sciences “from the theories of quantities, combination, and natural history in 
the widest sense,” that can serve as a “conscious presentation of the agreement 
between nature and mind,” and “have the reconciliation and unification of the 
two separated spheres, the process of freeing the human mind from the torture of 
empty abstractions and raw empiricism as its object” [J. Grassmann 1829, 1721. 
Justus Grassmann appears to see that the reasons why the combinatorics “that 
has mainly been worked out by the Germans” had previously found such little 
application in natural history were to be seen “predominantly in the development 
of the combinations according to classes in which the elements are counted with- 
out differentiating whether they are equal or different”; that is, that they belong to 
a purely extensional ontology. In this sense, even “the immortal Hindenburg” 
had damaged this science and “in some respects, Leibniz was his superior” [J. 
Grassmann 1829, 174-1751 [6]. 
12 MICHAEL OTTE HM 16 
The difference between analytical and synthetic thinking is first presented in 
sharp focus by Kant, and is sometimes conceived of by Kant in the sense of an 
essential difference between philosophy and mathematics. Philosophy explains 
objects from their concept analytically. Mathematics and natural science explain 
them from the construction of their relational structures and synthetically. Theory 
can only become conceptual and, at the same time constructive, analytical and, at 
the same time synthetical through the inclusion of its intended applications. Fur- 
thermore, according to H. Grassmann, it must achieve this in order to become 
scientific [7]. 
Kant’s distinction between philosophy and mathematics led to a separation of 
ontological and epistemological questions with the side effect of “freeing” pure 
mathematics from any explicit ontological commitments toward the end of the 
19th century. At the same time epistemology gained a prominent role dominating 
and guiding ontology. This made people like the Grassmanns search for connec- 
tions between a synthesis of nature and a synthesis of the mind. The two Grass- 
manns, as well as Romantic Nuturphzlosophen in general, although speaking in 
Kantian terminology, revived the fundamental methodological worries of 17th- 
century rationalists, namely “what is knowledge, what is truth, are there such 
things?” 
Kant no longer discusses the question “Is knowledge possible?” and in this his 
philosophy differs significantly from that of Descartes or Leibniz. One of the 
fundamental premises of Kantian epistemology is that knowledge is real, that it 
actually exists. Kant faces the fact of knowledge as it is expressed in pure mathe- 
matics and Newtonian science, that is, theoretical natural science. Generally 
speaking, the essential epistemological question in the 19th century was: How 
could the powers of the cognizing subject to reach real insight be enhanced? The 
17th and 18th centuries in contrast had asked: What is the world? What is being? 
Their “epistemology is a theory of delusion and the problem of true knowledge is 
substituted by an essentially ontological question: How is the world arranged, in 
which way does it exist? This was a very deep-reaching and general assumption of 
philosophical thinking in the 17th and the first half of the 18th century, so that 
Kant had to take great pains over questioning it. This assumption was actually 
based on the conviction that clear and distinct thinking understands being itself, 
and that the true nature of scientific thinking lies in this very comprehension of 
being” [Gaidenko 1981, 561. 
Early 19thcentury attitudes no longer considered a (formal) theory as repre- 
senting pure objectivity, but a synthesis of objectivity and subjectivity. 
3. GEOMETRY 
At the turn of the 18th century, there was a general dissatisfaction with the 
traditional approaches to geometry. That of Euclid lacked sufficient generality, 
and the Cartesian failed to invoke intuition. The “arbitrariness” of Cartesian 
coordinates was an issue of particular concern. H. Grassmann, for instance, in the 
preface to his AusdehnungsZehre of 1844, states that the use of his new calculus 
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of extension transforms every formula into a meaningful specific “law. ” The 
calculation itself, he says, is nothing but the symbolic expression of a conceptual 
argument going hand in hand with that calculation, whereas the introduction of 
arbitrary coordinates, which have essentially nothing to do with the geometrical 
question at hand, clouds the ideas completely, the calculation itself becoming a 
dull and mechanical business that does not offer anything worthwhile to the mind 
[1844, 91 [8]. 
Leibniz also is not satisfied with either the Euclidean or Cartesian approach to 
geometry, and this because neither of them carries “analysis to its conclusion.” 
Cartesian analysis is not complete because it relies partly on propositions from 
Euclid (for instance, on the Pythagorean theorem) and Euclid himself employs 
axioms that are based on “sensual experience” only (for instance, the parallels 
postulate) [Leibniz 1966 I, 70-77; 1849-1863 VII, 355; 1915,541]. For Leibniz the 
great strength of mathematics is its concreteness or its representationalism. The 
analysis which is not carried through to its conclusion now leaves empirical intui- 
tion in its naturally given, overcomplicated, and confused form. This is insuffi- 
cient, especially if one wishes to go further than Euclid’s elements in geometry 
and make new discoveries, “for the imagination would lose itself here in a variety 
of figures if algebra did not come to its aid- until one erects a characteristic that is 
specific to geometry that will designate positions in the same way that arithmetic 
designates numbers” [Leibniz 1960, 22; 1962, 5711. Thus Leibniz searches in 
particular for a symbolic language in order to improve and support intuition, and 
he primarily thinks in terms of the duality of “symbol/object,” while Grassmann 
particularly concentrates on the relation between conceptual development and the 
development of formulae. Thus, in addition to taking empirical intuition as a basis, 
Grassmann takes, to use Kant’s terminology, pure intuition, in which the con- 
structivity of thinking is expressed as a purpose, and he thus thinks in the triad of 
“concept/symbol/object. ” This difference no doubt is due first to the fact that 
Grassmann did not believe that building knowledge can completely be reduced to 
a combination of concepts starting with a certain number of simple ones, a view 
Leibniz seems to have held in one form or other. In fact Grassmann thinks that the 
implied combinatorial calculation would end up in complete unsurveyability. Fur- 
thermore the difference is to be attributed to the fact that 19th-century thinkers no 
longer believed that cognition or the setting up of a calculus is solely guided by 
given objects under consideration, either directly or indirectly through the media- 
tion of symbols, but one has rather to construct always new objects and thereby 
continuously to enlarge the universe about which theory speaks. 
In a short manuscript, “Quid sit Idea,” written in about 1690, Leibniz says that 
in order to really have an idea of an object, it is necessary that there is something 
within me “that not only leads me to the object but that in addition expresses or 
represents it” [Leibniz 1875-1890 VII, 2631. 
Although in Cartesian “analytic” geometry the objects are explicitly defined, 
points by pairs or triples of numbers, lines by linear equations, etc., these defini- 
tions were considered to be rather arbitrary, just conventional names given to 
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these objects, and geometric truths became just arithmetical statements. The 
question of the real or objective meaning of geometrical propositions remained 
implicit and only indirectly represented by numerical order. What kind of connec- 
tion exists between definitions and ideas? Real definitions, as distinguished from 
nominal definitions, according to Leibniz had to “contain the affirmation of a 
possibility” [Leibniz 1875-1890 IV, 450; 1966 I, 44f]. Grassmann additionally 
asked for conceptual construction and mental dynamics. The conceptual element 
expresses a sort of historical self-consciousness, which is not just passive immedi- 
ate grasping of some given object, but is always an excursion beyond the bound- 
aries of the immediately given. 
For geometry, this implies in particular a turning from the individual figures or 
“ideas” to the free constructive generation of figures according to a conceptually 
conceived unitary principle as well as to the question of the mode of existence of 
such a principle. 
Expressed in the terms of the historical development of scientific thought, 
Leibniz’s intention was to open up the variety of the world to thought. He had the 
idea that one can anticipate, by means of logical combinations, the progress of 
empirical science, while in his time Grassmann had to accept the variety of the 
world and of scientific thought, and had to see the special task of mathematical 
thought as coming to terms with this variety. Theory and science in general now 
had to fulfill an important mission in building up the self-awareness and the 
identity of the human subject itself. 
It will be one of the main suggestions of this paper that although Leibniz and 
Grassmann both belonged to an intellectual tradition which shows marked differ- 
ences from, say, the French tradition of positivistic science, by their common 
interest in ontological questions, they nevertheless always seem to approach 
questions of their common concern from opposite sides [9]. 
Leibniz thought that truth is constituted by proof [Hacking 1984, 2141. Grass- 
mann demanded from a proof that it provide insight and not only truth. Leibniz 
was interested in an abstract “universal characteristic” in which proofs could be 
constructed and truth would become mechanical. It is true that Leibniz’s identifi- 
cation of truth and proof transformed truth into a matter of form. It is also true 
that finite demonstrations became the topic of mathematics and infinite demon- 
strations that of philosophy and that both had the same form. In this manner, 
geometrical analysis is, for instance, linked to the process of analytic truths about 
substances by means of analogy. A strict parallelism is constituted between math- 
ematical and philosophical methodology [Leibniz 1960,420-4231, whereas Grass- 
man starts, as we have seen in [7], from a contrast of philosophical and mathemat- 
ical methods. This parallelism of form, or this analogy, constitutes Leibniz’s 
“solution” of the problem that geometrical truths appear at the same time to be 
empirical and therefore contingent as well as analytic and therefore necessary. 
Leibniz’s concerns were not epistemological ones. 
For Leibniz a formal analogy between philosophy, mathematics, and logic 
seemed sufficient so that both Couturat and Russell later stated that “Leibniz’s 
metaphysics rests solely upon the principles of his logic and proceeds entirely 
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from them” [Russell 1903, 1781. The converse is true, however [Mahnke 1925, 
66@, Mates 1986, 1221, and we have to keep in mind the ontological foundation 
when we consider the claims for his churucteristica uniuersulis or “universal 
mathematics,” the germ of which he produced in his “De arte combinatoria” 
published when he was 20, that “. . . there would be no more need of disputation 
between two philosophers than between two accountants. For it would suffice to 
take their pencils in their hands, to sit down to their slates, and to say to each 
other (with a friend as witness, if they liked): Let us calculate” [Leibniz 1875- 
1890 VII, 2001. 
Heath stated: “Now Leibniz realized of course that premises are required first, 
but he thought they could be obtained very simply. By analyzing any notion until 
it was simple, he thought that all axioms or assumptions followed as identical 
propositions” [Heath 1917,39-401. Thus he was led by his view of ideas to believe 
that even the axioms of Euclid should be proved. So in his New Essays, “I would 
have people seek even the demonstration of the axioms of Euclid. . . And when I 
am asked the means of knowing and examining the innate principles, I reply . . . 
we must try to reduce them to first principles, i.e., to axioms which are identical, 
or immediate by means of definitions which are nothing but a distinct exposition of 
ideas” [Leibniz 1915, 731. Definitions, according to Leibniz, are no mere conven- 
tions but have to show the possibility of the idea defined. “From such definitions 
or ideas, all truths with the exception of identical propositions can be proved. . . . 
The latter are unprovable according to their nature and therefore are genuine 
axioms” [Leibniz 1915, 451. This is connected with his view that all our ideas are 
composed of a very small number of simple ideas, which together form an alpha- 
bet of human thoughts [Leibniz 1966 I, 391. This clearly expresses the attitudes of 
17th-century rationalism as shared by Descartes or Spinoza. This rationalism is 
based on an ontological foundation of knowledge (even the Cartesian “cogito ergo 
sum” is based on the ontological proof of the existence of God, as is Leibniz’s 
fundamental ‘ ‘principle of sufficient reason’ ‘). Again, however, ontology provides 
only the form of our analysis. Leibniz, by making analysis and proof “a matter of 
ontology. . . , asserts that all true propositions have an a priori proof although, in 
general, human beings cannot make those proofs” [Hacking 1984,221]. In a letter 
to Oldenburg in 1675, Leibniz wrote that men, after the accomplishment of the 
Churacteristic, will return to the investigation of nature alone, which can never be 
accomplished, because there is some element of chance or some contingency in 
even the most ingenuous and careful experiment {Leibniz 1976, 331-3321. 
The 19th century, on the other hand, regarded cognition as an activity following 
its own rules and gradually made these rules an object of investigation. Grass- 
mann, for instance, uses the structure of his general theory of forms as a primitive 
that is to be concretized by intended applications. This procedure is, on the one 
hand, constructive, and on the other guided by analogy and metaphorical relation 
with objective reality. He therefore sees similarities and differences in the respec- 
tive contributions of philosophy and mathematics to the true scientific method, 
which is to be based on a complementarity of constructive rigor and philosophical 
overview. 
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4. GEOMETRIC CHARACTERISTICS 
In a letter to Huygens of September 8, 1679, Leibniz complains that he was not 
satisfied with the algebraic methods, and adds: “I believe that we must have still 
another properly linear geometrical analysis, which directly expresses siturn as 
algebra expresses magnitudinem. And I believe I have the means for it, and that 
one could represent figures and even machines and movements in symbols, as 
algebra represents number or magnitude; I am sending you an essay which seems 
to me notable” [Leibniz 1849-1863 II, 191. 
From Leibniz’s writings it seems clear that the starting point was his conviction 
of the imperfection of algebra as the logical instrument of geometry. Thus, “Alge- 
bra itself is not the true characteristic of geometry, but quite another must be 
found, which I am certain would be more useful than algebra for the use of 
geometry in the mechanical sciences. And I wonder that this has hitherto been 
remarked by no one. For almost all men hold algebra to be the true mathematical 
art of discovery, and as long as they labor under this prejudice, they will never 
find the true characters of other sciences” (Leibniz after [Heath 1917,441). It must 
be noted, however, that here algebra is understood by Leibniz in its ordinary 
sense, not as a general term for any calculus, nor is it seen as a part of combina- 
tories. At other places, for instance, in the letter to Oldenburg of December 12, 
1675, already mentioned, he comes to believe that everything “which algebra 
proves is due only to a higher science, ” which he called “combinatorial character- 
istics” [Leibniz 1976, 3311. 
Leibniz realized the lack of rigor and generality of intuitive methods, but 
dreamed of a method which would be completely analytical while still possessing 
all the advantages of a synthetic method. In this his aim was similar to that which 
he had in mind for his universal characteristic, which was to be a logical calculus 
replacing concepts by combinations of signs, and which furthermore was not 
merely to furnish demonstrations of propositions but to be the means of discover- 
ing new ones. Thus in like manner, his geometrical calculus was to combine 
analysis with guidance of intuition. A fusion of analysis and synthesis having been 
made, the divorce between calculation and construction would disappear. “This 
new characteristic . . . will not fail to give at the same time the solution, construc- 
tion, and geometrical demonstration, the whole in a natural manner and by an 
analysis” [Leibniz 1966 I, 771. 
Grassmann, commenting on this passage by Leibniz, claimed to have fulfilled 
Leibniz’s perspectives. “As in this analysis [i.e., the “Geometrische Analyse” 
M.O.] every equation is but the analytical expression of a geometrical relation- 
ship, and as this relationship explains itself by means of this equation without 
being clouded by arbitrary magnitudes- as, for instance, the coordinates of the 
ordinary analysis are and as furthermore every transformation of such an equa- 
tion is only the expression of a geometrical construction accompanying that trans- 
formation, it follows that the analysis presented gives indeed at the same time the 
analytical solution, the construction, and the proof of a geometrical problem” 
[Grassmann 1847, 396-3971. 
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The problems of a “science of form” or Leibniz’s idea of a “universal charac- 
teristic” were conceived of very differently by Grassmann, though he appreciated 
Leibniz’s intentions to create a truly geometrical analysis. These two things must 
be distinguished carefully, as Grassmann points out in the introduction to his 
Geometrische Ardyse. He does this because he wants to justify his criticism of 
the fact that Leibniz founded the fundamental definitions of his characteristic on 
congruence. Congruence (geometrical equality) is a union of two relations, of 
similarity and quantitative equivalence. All points are equal and similar, so all 
points are congruent. Hence if we use = for congruence, the expression u = x, 
where u is fixed and x is variable, is a definition of space. ax = bc represents a 
sphere of center a and radius bc. Also, ax = bx represents a plane that bisects ab 
perpendicularly. Again ux = bx = cx gives the locus of the center of all spheres 
that pass through a, b, c; and so it is a straight line. abx = ubc is a statement of the 
congruence of two triangles in space, which therefore represents the locus of 
points whose distances from the points u, b are the same as the distances of c from 
u, b. That is, it is a circle. This “reductionist” explanation of the meaning of 
abx = abc is in fact a bit misleading. It suggests that this expression be read as a 
combination of ax = ac and bx = bc (i.e., the circle considered as an intersection 
of two spheres). The combination, using in addition ub = ab, is based on the s. s. s. 
congruence theorem for triangles in Euclidean space. 
Grassmann, restating Leibniz’s ideas in the first paragraph of his Geometrische 
Andyse, proceeds in this manner, whereas Leibniz himself, in his letter to Huy- 
ghens, explicitly calls abx = ubc the “definition” of the circle [lo]. As congruent 
triangles have congruent sides, ax = ac and bx = bc result from this definition. It 
is important to note that the “condensed” expression ubx = abc is not just a 
symbolic abbreviation, but has a geometrical meaning of its own, i.e., that Leib- 
niz’s calculus is really analytic in this case. This demonstrates not only the differ- 
ence but also the connection between Leibniz’s and Grassmann’s approaches as 
distinguished from seemingly similar ones like those of Plucker, Hesse, and 
Salmon [ 111. We shall see this more clearly later. 
There are several obvious defects in this calculus, however. These appear at 
once if we attempt to use it to solve the fundamental problem in geometry of 
finding the expression for a straight line passing through two given points. 
Grassmann’s treatment is as follows: We saw above that the expression for a 
straight line is 
ax = bx = cx. 
If we 
write 
now take three auxiliary points, a’, b’, c’, that are in a straight line, and 
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then these congruences together represent the required straight line through u and 
6, as the locus of X. Combining the last two we get 
atx s b’x G c’x 
aba’ = abb’ = abc’. 
If this expression were to represent the line directly and not in the indirect manner 
of coordinate geometry, it must be possible to eliminate the arbitrary auxiliary 
points that have nothing to do with the nature of the problem. Grassmann could 
not see how to do that (and nobody else has since). Therefore we are still left with 
arbitrary coordinates when representing geometrical entities. This is the judgment 
of Russell, Couturat, Heath, and so forth. 
The alternatives seem quite obvious. Either one is able to construct higher 
dimensional elements, such as lines, for instance, subject to the rules of the 
calculus, or one has to fix so many auxiliary positions that the situation can be 
determined by means of a distance function alone. To generalize this fact in 
epistemological terms, a constructive approach to reality in cognition that tries to 
take into account the “things themselves” and operate symbolically in this man- 
ner cannot in advance decide on the relevant ontology. It does not separate the 
objective and the constructive sides from each other. The Cartesian as well as the 
Euclidean approaches to geometry on the contrary have fixed the type of entities 
about which theory is to speak once and for all. They had accordingly among 
other things to struggle with all kinds of only approximate understandings and 
with sorts of “imaginary elements” or exceptional cases. For instance, Grass- 
mann, when in 1845 he wrote a prospectus of his Ausdehnungslehre at the invita- 
tion of Grunert, stressed that the generality and transparency of the theorems of 
his theory of extension are essentially due to a liberation of its considerations from 
the limitation to three dimensions. As algebra lacks the idea of “dimension” 
completely and as geometrical space is confined to only three dimensions, the 
theory of extension cannot be a part of either of those [Grassmann 1844, 2971. 
It has been argued [Echeverria 1979,269] that by referring to equations, Grass- 
mann has rejected the essential element of Leibniz’s project from the very begin- 
ning. In employing equations instead of congruence relations, Grassmann misses 
the essential point of Leibniz’s project, namely, generality. This is, in short, the 
essential point of Echeverrfa’s evaluation [Echeverrta 1979, 270-2711. This argu- 
ment seems difficult to understand, first because equations by themselves, like 
any other relations, had no ontological significance for Leibniz. In addition to this, 
any equivalence relation can obviously be transformed into equality by means of a 
definition by abstraction. Furthermore it is, because of the little-developed status 
of Leibniz’s geometrical ideas, not easy to say whether Leibniz’s taking congru- 
ence as “geometric equality” is not just a sign of his “traditionalism.” The 
question is not what kind of equivalence relation is used to construct the members 
of the universe of the theory but rather how the objectivity of this universe is 
conceived. 
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Grassmann restates ub = de as an equality fig. (u,b,) = fig. (d,e,) [1847, 3311 in 
order to characterize the congruence relation on a metalevel as a function of two 
arguments. He proceeds like this in order to compare the different possible rela- 
tionships between positions in space according to their respective forms and 
purposes, and not in order to introduce algebraic manipulations into geometry. He 
takes a relational point of view comparing different geometrical relationships 
(congruence, similarity, etc.) as one would analyze and compare natural laws or 
functional principles with respect to their form and effect. He says, for instance, 
that since it can always be reduced to a function of only two arguments, congru- 
ence is formally or structurally the simplest possible geometrical relationship. 
With respect to the problem of fixing geometrical position, however, congruence 
is the most complicated one. 
Now Cassirer has claimed this argumentation to be completely in accordance 
with Leibniz’s ideas. He even states that Leibniz’s “analysis situs” is an attempt 
to use the general idea of a function for the benefit of the space problem while 
avoiding any algebraic mediation [Cassirer 1902, 1491. However, putting the math- 
ematical function concept in a central position so definitely reflects a Kantian state 
of mind that it could not have been adopted wholeheartedly even by Grassmann. 
And first of all, one would have to trace the transformations of the function con- 
cept itself between the 18th and 19th centuries. In his later, more formalist period, 
Grassmann claimed that linear geometry has to precede metric geometry, because 
within the latter one has to use the function concept to make things clear [ 1862,7]. 
Nevertheless, if we compare the ideas of Leibniz and Grassmann on a more or 
less formal level of “pure concepts,” Cassirer’s account contains worthwhile 
information for an historical analysis [Lewis 1977, 128-1291. 
The “relational” point of view, as represented by Grassmann’s argument, per 
se introduces a duality into our concepts of meaning, as we have seen, by con- 
trasting a structural with an intentional or “functional” consideration. This point 
of view results in a greater dissociation of the notion of object or substance from 
that of property or relation and at the same time leads to circular connections of 
both. Cassirer [Cassirer 1910, 123-1241 tries to avoid this circularity by distin- 
guishing between the psychological starting point and the logical foundation of 
mathematical cognition. The first is dependent on entities which support relation- 
ships, the meaning of a relation being grasped only by means of some terms, 
which serve as its material basis, whereas the latter expresses the fact that the 
logical import of the relation is independent of such origin and even that the 
related entities only attain a definite character by means of the relationships. This 
circular connection now in fact expresses a central concern of both Leibniz and 
Grassmann, namely, their common aim of discovering a geometric characteristic 
that is both analytic -or in Grassmann’s terms, which proceeds from the general 
or formal to the particular- and synthetic-going from the particular and empiri- 
cal to the general (see [7]) in contrast to the Euclidean and Cartesian approaches 
to geometry, which were only synthetic and analytic, respectively. 
Grassmann himself calls the first of Cassirer’s distinctions philosophical deriva- 
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tion and the second, mathematical proof [ 1847, 3471. To find the laws of the inner 
product as statements of a theory of space he uses for instance the theorem of 
Pythagoras, which in turn can be proved as soon as the axioms of an inner product 
space are established and described in postulational terms. It seems telling that 
what was conceived at the origin of the “axiomatic movement” to be philosophi- 
cal analysis was later on reduced merely to a psychological level. Through this 
shift the understanding of the fact that mathematics according to Grassmann was 
to be dependent not only on formal construction but also on philosophical and 
historical awareness was lost. 
In contrast Grassmann starts from the primary role of the conceptual-construc- 
tive and from the empirically given, although he considers the latter indispens- 
able. He is convinced that the same basic syntheses upon which pure mathematics 
depends also control the formation of experiential knowledge. He constructs the 
ontology of his geometric analysis in a purely postulational way, on the basis of 
the axioms of space. The fundamental elements in this are point magnitudes that 
consist of positions in space and numerical values. In his Geometrische AnaZyse, 
Grassmann states that two point magnitudes in this sense “can only then be 
identified when both the position in space to which they are bound and also their 
measured values are equal” [ 1847, 4341. 
For the ‘figures in plane geometry, this results in equality of area instead of 
congruence as the equivalence relation that constitutes the object of inquiry on the 
“ground level” of a geometrical theory of space. 
Through this connection of theory and intended application one is led to a 
thinking in terms of the real relationships that constitute the objects under consid- 
eration. In this way Grassmann comes to express a plane in space in the following 
way: 
a - b - c - x = 0. 
Here a, b, c are three different fixed points not situated on the same straight line, x 
being an arbitrary point, and the above product of points denotes volumes [ 1844, 
1951. This equation is strikingly similar to Leibniz’s 
ax = bx (plane) or abc = abx (circle) 
in as much as both express a relational structure that constitutes the plane and the 
circle, respectively. The difference rests exclusively on the use of a different 
fundamental relation-congruence vs. quantitative equivalence in each case. 
5. EQUALITY AND DIFFERENCE 
“Equality” is a genuinely historical issue. It does not get much attention since 
the Hilbert-Cantor approach to mathematics has generally been accepted. If we 
assume that everything is a set then the problems connected with equality no 
longer arise. We shall then have an “absolute” identity relation on the entire 
universe. 
But the issue of equality deserves more attention as far as mathematics is 
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constructive and as far as it is sensitive to objective or content-related aspects of 
mathematization. Loosely speaking, the first aspect is more concerned with the 
problem of the equivalence of constructions and the second is concentrated on 
mathematical truth as a matter of adequacy of the mathematical construction or 
model (how the theoretical entities are to be distinguished from, as well as related 
to, external reality). The first aspect is analytical and the second, synthetical. 
To investigate the matter a little further, let us consider the idea of an equation 
u = b. It holds, and thereby it differs from the equation a = u. Besides the 
identical which is indicated by the equals sign, something different as well is 
suggested by the use of the different symbols u and b. These are what Whitehead 
has called the truism and the paradox, respectively, of an equation. 
According to where one places the identity and the difference, one can see such 
an equation in two ways. One can conceive u and b as different objects and then 
say that the equation designates an equal aspect or an identical property of the 
different objects u and b. However, one can also conceive a and b as different 
properties of the same object, and then the equation designates the fact that 
different aspects of the same object are being treated; a and b are intensionally 
different but extensionally identical. 
Matters become even more complex by distinguishing whether we deal with 
abstract concepts u and b or with empirical phenomena. The first conception of 
the equation, for instance, in one case founds the process of definition by abstrac- 
tion and that of empirical comparison or measurement otherwise. Similarly for the 
second conception: in one case “amalgamation” of abstract objects leads to fun- 
damental laws as in “the discovery of the relation between electricity, magnetism, 
and light, which were found to be different aspects of the same thing, which we 
call today the electromagnetic field” [Feynman & Leighton 1977, 31. On the other 
hand, this conception may just be seen as the process of naming and denotation of 
empirical, objectively given entities. We shall for the moment try to ignore the 
“ontological” problem, and concentrate in a formal manner on the equivalence 
relation itself. 
If one begins with the first conception of the equation, and in this way gains new 
objects in the properties or the relations, one can again directly designate these 
newly obtained objects, this same aspect, in the different objects with which one 
has started. And, finally, one can see the objects with which one started as aspects 
of the newly constructed object and in this way arrive at the other conception of 
the equation. This symmetry of perspectives depends, however, on whether rela- 
tions, properties, and objects are considered to be of equal ontological status. 
Leibniz did not accept such a similarity. 
Depending on the perspective of the equation we take, we either move syntheti- 
cally upward through abstraction to new objects of higher complexity, or we 
proceed through analysis and reification from more complex objects to single 
properties that we can then conceive as separate objects; as a person who plays 
different roles can in certain circumstances appear to be a completely different 
person when he has changed roles, or, as in economics one passes from the 
general concept of value to the concrete utility values that represent the abstract 
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economic value. This process of individualization pursued further and further 
ends up with just numerical difference. It is in this sense that Grassmann defines 
the fundamental elements of the process of theory development by saying they 
represent just the particular as distinguished from some other particular without 
any reference to content. “It is,” writes Grassmann, “irrelevant in what respect 
one element differs from another, for it is specified simply as being different, 
without assigning a real content to the difference. Our science shares this notion 
of element with combinatorics” [1844, 471. 
One is certainly justified to say that Grassmann’s perspective is balanced both 
with respect to the two considerations of an equation and with respect to what 
have been called formal versus ontological interests. Only after Kant did synthesis 
and analysis come to gain a status of equal importance. Leibniz is still asserting 
that every true affirmative proposition is analytic. 
The crucial role that logic plays for Leibniz is in the derivation of the concept of 
substance. Leibniz refused the Cartesian notion of substance as pure extension, 
and he tried to conceptualize substance in terms of intensions or qualities. Besides 
extension, according to Leibniz, there must be a substance or quality that is 
extended 1121. The identity of a substance stems from its properties which make 
up the complete concept of this substance. The complete concept enables one 
logically to differentiate a substance from all others. This reverses the relationship 
between genus and species from what it is for an extensional view. Leibniz inter- 
prets a proposition like “all congruent triangles are similar” to mean the concept 
of similarity is contained in the concept of congruence, for congruent triangles 
contain all the properties of similar triangles and also others. Congruence be- 
comes the most general geometrical relation. If we are comparing things according 
to quantity and to quality, respectively, it follows that congruence expressing 
equality in both these respects is the most general or concrete geometrical equal- 
ity. Algebraic equality refers only to extension and extension is only the abstract 
of what is extended [Leibniz 1875-1890 VI, 582f}. Leibniz sets congruence as the 
absolute geometric identity, as it represents an equality according to both external 
and internal definitions, according to quantity as well as to quality. Congruence is, 
as Couturat writes, “en quelque sorte la plus grande relation qui puisse exister 
entre deux objets, . . . , c’est-a-dire l’identite pure et simple” [Couturat 1901, 
31 lf]. 
This dominance of substance is closely linked to Leibniz’s principle of the 
identity of indiscernibles. The latter consists in the thesis that there are no two 
substances which resemble each other entirely but only differ numerically because 
then their complete concepts would coincide. In his fourth letter to Clarke, Leib- 
niz writes: “There is no such thing as two individuals indiscernible from each 
other. An ingenious gentleman of my acquaintance, discoursing with me in the 
presence of Her Electoral Highness, the Princess Sophia, in the garden of Her- 
renhausen, thought he could find two leaves perfectly alike. The princess defied 
him to do it, and he ran all over the garden a long time to look for some; but it was 
to no purpose. Two drops of water or milk, viewed with a microscope, will appear 
distinguishable from each other. This is an argument against atoms, which are 
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confuted, as well as a vacuum, by the principles of true metaphysics” [Leibniz 
1956, 361. 
In his fifth letter to Clarke he states: “I said that in sensible things, two that are 
indiscernible from each other can never be found; . . . I believe that these general 
observations in things sensible, hold also in proportion in things insensible . . . 
And it is a great objection against indiscernibles, that in sensible things no instance 
of them is to be found” [Leibniz 1956, 61-621. So Leibniz shared the first of the 
two conceptions of an equation. Both Leibniz and Grassmann held an intensional 
view of the ontology of a theory. 
For reasons of his understanding of substance Leibniz is, at least with respect to 
propositions about existents or possible existents, committed to a subject-predi- 
cate logic. “For Leibniz relational statements about substances can never afford 
information about them that is not given more fully and adequately by a suitable 
complex of predications. . . . A relation has no standing apart from the existence 
of the relata and their properties” [Rescher 1979, 571. 
The fact that Leibniz failed to grasp the significance of relational propositions, 
in particular with respect to conceptual synthesis, certainly was of great disadvan- 
tage to his ideas of “geometrical characteristics. ” 
One essential feature of the algebraic mode of thought since the 19th century is 
that it deals with mathematical relations rather than with objects, and that it rests 
more on a logic of relations than on a logic of predicates. If by an ontology in the 
modern sense we understand the sets of those entities whose existence is stipu- 
lated by the theory, it is quite obvious that geometrical ontology in Grassmann’s 
sense is composed of substances (positions in space) as well as relations (see [5]), 
and furthermore, relations of relations. For Grassmann, all points, considered as a 
set of geometric loci, are a priori different. Together with the real numbers, they 
form a basis for a stepwise reconstruction of geometrical space, by means of 
specific magnitudes (a “point magnitude,” for instance, consists of a position in 
space together with a real number as coefficient). But all points are also “equal,” 
belonging to the same “species.” This fact constitutes relations among them. The 
directed line segment from point A and B provides an example of such a relation- 
ship. Grassmann expresses it by means of an anticommutative “product” Al3 of 
these points. 
The “elements” on which Grassmann founds the constructive process, that is, 
positions in space, represent at the beginning pure intension, numerical diversity 
being logically prior to any diversity as to properties or relations. The construc- 
tion occurs in two ways: through addition which produces “point magnitudes” 
which have extension as well as intension, and through multiplication resulting in 
continuous extension. 
In a calculus as envisaged by Leibniz or Grassmann, propositions or judg- 
ments generally take the form of assertions of equivalence. One entity is asserted 
to be equivalent to another entity and may therefore be substituted for the other in 
the calculus, wherever the first occurs. Two things, equivalent in this sense, are 
identified. This implies that the universe of discourse does not exist independently 
of the way we formulate propositions about its entities in the calculus. In addition, 
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within any such calculus, only one type of identity exists. We have here in a sense 
a “global” conceptualization of equivalence. As Whitehead has pointed out 
[Whitehead 1898, 181, “this definition is so far from being obvious or necessary for 
any symbolic calculus that it actually excludes . . . the differential calculus ex- 
cepting limited parts of it. ” An equationf(x) = 0 for some X, for instance, does not 
necessarily imply that the derivative at this point x is also equal to zero. During 
the 19th century, there was in fact a lot of argumentation with respect to the 
difference between ‘ ‘local” numerical versus ‘ ‘global” algebraic al equality 
[Jahnke 1987; Grattan-Guinness 1970; Boutroux 19201. 
Linearity comes to an extrapolation of the local to the global. Linear space can, 
for instance, be considered to be an idealization of “arbitrarily large small pertur- 
bations,” to use an expression of Y. Manin. The following equation helps to 
illustrate the crossing from the “global view” of variable magnitudes to the local 
perspective of functions: 
.fW = fiXI + Gf - 4A (X being a fixed value). 
If A is a variable, f will be a linear function, whereas it will be a differentiable 
function, if we understand A to be a continuous function. Many mathematicians of 
the 19th century was the peculiar achievement of contemporary mathematics in 
this very transition from quantities to functions, believing at the same time that 
mathematics would thereby be enabled to produce direct or “literal” truths of all 
kinds [Schellbach 1883, 16-171. The statements of a calculus or characteristics on 
the other hand would always constitute formal knowledge which is only by means 
of analogy related to empirical reality or real phenomena. Leibniz and Grassmann 
share this kind of rationalism, which later on led to the axiomatic view of mathe- 
matics as well as to phenomenology in the sense of Husserl. 
It is sometimes said that today’s combinatorial topology should legitimately be 
viewed as the elaboration of Leibniz’s ideas of analysis situs, and even that 
Leibniz invented topology, being motivated “by a theory of the notation needed 
for valid proof” [Hacking 1984, 2131. However, the objects of topology are mere 
invariants of a system of operations and mappings and, taken in extension, repre- 
sent a generality and abstractness that may hardly ever be directly related to a 
practical understanding of reality or to any immediate experience of some real 
content. In the perspective of mathematization this raises the problem of how to 
counterbalance the equivocation of representation and abstraction by some idea 
of objective relationship. Formal calculability and coherence as well as realistic 
meaning are two aspects that have to be recognized if knowledge is not just taken 
as a finished product. 
For instance, in order to really establish the congruence relation as equality in 
the context of an axiomatic theory we would have to single out those functions 
and predicates that make up the substitution axioms, which distinguish equality 
from other equivalence relations, i. e . , those n-ary functions for predicates p for 
which it holds that: 
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Xi = Yip 
-- 
z- 1 7. * * 7 n implies 
. f b  9 l .  -  ,  A = f(yi 9 .  .  .  ,  YJ and 
p(q, . . . , xJ + p(yl . . . yJ, respectively. 
As we have already mentioned above, the ordinary conjunction of areas in the 
plane or volumes in space, or n-dimensional parallelepipeds in n-dimensional 
space is not among those functions. 
For Grassmann this was, however, important since he wanted to build a theory 
that would be in accordance with the activities of measurement [ 131. 
It is not that he cared for measurement as an empirical activity. For him, it is on 
the one hand clear that one cannot reject the task of measurement in geometry and 
that “the result of this measurement” has to be expressed “in numerical terms” 
[1844, 1371. On the other hand, one would be “robbing (pure) geometry of its 
essential content” if one wished to do without, for example, the development of 
an independent and formal theory of quantitative equivalence in geometry and 
were simply to base measurement on the concepts of number and function [ 1844, 
1381. 
In summary, the genetic perspective on knowledge as a process, not as a 
finished product, requires a heuristic which depends on realistic notions of mean- 
ing and truth. On the other hand this realism only matters to the extent to which it 
can be transformed into a coherent formal system. Any particular mathematical 
theory results, according to Grassmann, from the interaction of two contrasts, one 
of which “is related to the method of generation” and the other “to the elements 
of generation” [1844, 25-261. The first expresses the real, and the second the 
formal aspects of mathematics. 
Methodological worries of the 17th century, in contrast, were concerned with 
only one of those questions, namely “What is knowledge, what is truth, are there 
such things ?” [Hacking 1984,220]. However, Grassmann believes that activity as 
a coherent system founds epistemology but activity is always to be objectively 
mediated and is not a subjective trait. This is another important connection be- 
tween Leibniz and Grassmann, which distinguishes both of them from Kant and 
Kantianism. For Grassmann and Leibniz synthesis is not foremost subjective 
construction, which is substantiated by the activity of the Transcendental Subject, 
but is representation of real existing connections and relationships. The subjective 
character of Cartesian geometrical synthesis was (see part 3) an issue of common 
criticism by Grassmann and Leibniz. 
It might well be that Kant, in his endeavors to find out how pure mathematics 
and theoretical natural science were possible, had been the first to proceed from 
the study of the result of cognition to revealing the possibilities of its generation. 
Moving toward the realization of this task Kant separates self-consciousness from 
knowledge of objects and thereby provides the subject with a double role. The 
unity of objective knowledge would be impossible if the flow of external experi- 
ence were not continually being accompanied by self-consciousness. On the other 
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hand, “internal experience is itself possible only mediately and through external 
experience” as Kant states in criticizing Descartes. 
In the end, however, Kant actually reverts to Descartes in formulating the 
proposition that unity of self-consciousness is the fundamental basis of objective 
experience. 
Accepting that substances exist objectively, one can to a certain extent apply 
both the above interpretations of the equality relation, interpreting it as a property 
of substances and determining through comparison whether the substances are 
equal according to external relations such as size, and also asking whether or 
not they differ according to their essential qualities or intensions. According to 
Leibniz, a geometric figure “contains in general beyond the quantity also a certain 
quality or form, and in the way that things are equal that have the same size, that 
which possesses the same form is similar” [Leibniz 1966 I, 711. The similarity or 
equality of form is now for Leibnitz exactly defined as an equality according to 
internal relations or properties. He writes, “We will call two figures that lie before 
us similar if one is not in a position to state a feature in the one observed by itseZf 
[my emphasis] that also is not to be found in the other” [Leibniz 1966 I, 73; 1966 I, 
55; 1849-1863 V, 1531. 
The second type of equality is for Leibniz, however, the essence that is objec- 
tively present in the objects themselves, and this is exactly what is stated in his 
fundamental principle of the identity of indiscernibles. 
If one does not undertake classification of the desired geometric characteristic 
from the classification of the equivalence relations used, but out of an ontological 
stance like Leibniz, it can be determined that the classification in the sense of 
Leibniz is more general than either the Cartesian or Euclidean approach to geome- 
try, because it is that characteristic that treats the forms of objects, taking them in 
intension, their quality in general, or the “relation of similar and different in 
them,” while algebra simply “deals with the formulae of quantity or of the rela- 
tion of equal and different. For this reason, algebra is inferior to the art of combi- 
nation” [Leibniz 1966 I, SO]. In other words: The object of this general character- 
istic arises from the aggregation of the different, while the object of algebra is only 
the equal. Quality is then essentially grasped as constituted through similarity and 
difference, whereas quantitative differences always presuppose essential equality. 
This now corresponds exactly to Grassmann’s conception of the object of his 
AusdehnungsZehre. For him, the “extension” likewise arises from the similar and 
different, and the decisive thought in his Ausdehnungslehre consists in the fact 
“that a multiple sum of different quantities is treated as an independent quantity” 
[ 1862, 51. In other words, he calls that which comes from the equal the algebraic, 
and that which comes from the different the combinatory form [1844, 251. 
We should note, however, that the duality of the qualitative may easily be 
understood as an equivocation of representation and abstraction. On the one hand 
quality taken as the similar appears as a sort of immediacy of the object. On the 
other hand cognition transgressing the form of being essentially grasps quality as 
difference. This signifies a passing from an isolated being to an abstract structure, 
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as the notion of difference makes sense only when related to structure. It also 
signifies a passing from concrete objects to formal entities or from an extensional 
to an intensional point of view as meaning within a given theory wilI depend more 
on reference as the theory deals more directly with facts and will depend more on 
structural coherence as the theory is highly sophisticated. 
Grassmann starts with undifferentiated difference, distinction, pure and simple, 
or distinction as a mere act of will; Leibniz bases everything on the principle of 
indiscernibles, which implies that any distinction has to rely on differences in the 
properties of some substances, because “a mere will without any motive is a 
fiction, not only contrary to God’s perfection, but also chimerical and contradic- 
tory” [Leibniz 1956, 361. 
Only in a second step Grassmann specifically qualifies the different and similar, 
which constitutes the subject matter of the Ausdehnungslehre to be a “combina- 
tory-continuous form or extensive quantity” [ 1844, 26]. Grassmann describes 
space by its homogeneity and isotropy, as the most important properties for 
physics. He states that in order to found the notion of space, the ideas of a 
difference with respect to position only (with every other aspect of a construction 
remaining the same) and of a difference of direction (without any other variation 
taking place) have to be presupposed [ 1844, 65-661. In short, Grassmann bases 
the axiomatic description of space on the general principles of action and move- 
ment within space. One might say he employs an imagination of the mind as an 
active, material body that takes into account all other bodies in his movements. 
Leibniz, on the contrary, derives his fundamental principles and axioms, like the 
principle of the identity of indiscernibles, out of a God’s-eyes perspective on the 
world. 
“Within the Ausdehnungslehre the straight line appears specifically and in spe- 
cific contrast to Euclid as the basis of geometrical definitions” [Grassmann 1844, 
2931. This marks another contrast to Leibniz, who is still confined to the Euclid- 
ean way of looking at geometry, at least with respect to the imagination of the 
character of geometrical objects. The straight line accepted as a fundamental 
object signifies a relational mode of thinking. Justus Grassmann had already based 
his combinatory constructions on “the unlimited straight line” instead of on finite 
geometric figures, and the “premise of difference that this requires is the differ- 
ence in direction” (cf. also [1844, 291). This postulation of the straight line as the 
basic element has in fact become the fundamental reference point in the change 
and further development of geometry since the second half of the 18th century. In 
the second volume of his AnaZytisch-Geometrische EntwickZungen, Plucker 
writes: “In that Monge introduced the equation of the straight line into analytical 
geometry, and thereby laid the foundation for the banishment of all constructions 
from the same, he gave geometry that new form that made its further development 
possible” [ 1831,4]. The importance of Monge’s approach “lies in the tendency to 
formalize the straight line in analytic symbols” as Boyer writes [Boyer 1956,206]. 
It has become clear from the above that in both Grassmann’s and Leibniz’s 
concept, true geometric analysis must be concerned with the “similar and differ- 
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ent.” The final result has been that the relation between the different, similar, and 
equal and the principles of treating equations are of fundamental importance, not 
only in order to use the operative potentials of arithmetic and algebra, but also 
because numbers and measurement are basic relations to external reality. Grass- 
mann’s particular concern was to find methods that are true to nature “according 
to which each application of mathematics to nature must progress, and equally 
according to which geometry has to be treated if it is meant to lead to general and 
prolific results, ’ ’ and, in the sense of the relation between different and equal, 
between quality and quantity, it is a criterion of confirmation for him that “the 
difference between the analytic and the synthetic treatment of geometry com- 
pletely” disappears through his analysis [ 1844, 91. 
6. MEASUREMENT, SYMMETRY, AND ONTOLOGY 
In his third reply to Leibniz, Clarke included the argument that space cannot be 
merely relational since it is a quantity “which situation and order are not” [Leib- 
niz 1956, 321. Leibniz replied that “relative things have their quantity as well as 
absolute ones” [Leibniz 1956,751, and he tried to substantiate this claim by means 
of an analogy from numerical ratios. But this analogy in connection with the 
objection raised by Clarke shows that the interaction of subject and object (space) 
must be made the focus of consideration, or, to state it in terms of the last section, 
that the objects of knowing are constructed and given at the same time, Relations, 
as quantity in relative things, take on an objective character, in the same manner 
as measurement is both relative and objective. 
H. Grassmann tried to discover the fundamental principles of calculation and 
measurement, considering the latter also to be not merely conventional means but 
objectively founded. The methods of modern axiomatics, which in some sense 
originated with Grassmann’s work, transformed geometrical space into a means of 
theoretical activity by analyzing the abstract structures of measurement. Mea- 
surement was indeed a problem that intrigued many, with respect to the relation- 
ship between activity and knowledge. At least this is the understanding of a new 
generation of scientists and mathematicians who consider only those aspects of 
reality that have been “produced” by their own activity (by means of carefully 
designed experiments, etc.) [Caneva 19741 to be a legitimate subject matter of 
scientific concern. 
Measurement forms the basis for our concrete knowledge of the world. Mea- 
surement as such, however, always contains an arbitrary and subjective element, 
as does the introduction of Cartesian coordinates. This is why a “theory of relativ- 
ity is perforce always involved in measurement,” as H. Weyl once stressed. For 
him, mathematics came to play its role in natural science in the following way: 
“An essential feature of measurement is the difference between the ‘determina- 
tion’ of an object by individual specification and the determination of the same 
object by some conceptual means. The latter is only possible relative to objects 
which must be defined directly” [Weyl 1921, 8-91. 
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The “direct definition” alluded to in this quotation can theoretically be accom- 
plished only by symbolic means, such as the use of letters to represent geometric 
positions directly and without extension. I would like to ignore for the moment the 
problem of how these symbols can be made to refer to positions in empirical 
space. But even if I assume that this can be done because God knows, as Leibniz 
would claim, which symbol refers to a given empirical position or object, I would 
now have to ask myself what it means to take into account conceptually the 
interwovenness of relativism and objectivity inherent here. If I proceed in this 
way the notions of symmetry and invariance come into play. Meaningful symme- 
try operations are visible in one description and invisible in another, which is 
invariant under the symmetry operation. Hence, such an invariant description 
gives the object “directly” and formally. In Grassmann’s calculus of extension, 
A + J3, for instance, designates the midpoint iU of the points A and B with the 
mass value 2 attached to it. This concrete geometrical meaning results from con- 
siderations of symmetry. The position of M, for instance, results from the commu- 
tative law A + B = B + A, etc. This “symmetry” defines addition as a particular 
invariant. As Grassmann states it: “The particular type of connection is deter- 
mined by what is held to be its result, that is, under what conditions and in which 
extension the result is posited as remaining the same” 11844, 351. And later on he 
describes how a formal expression may attain a concrete meaning by looking for 
all such expressions that are equal to the one given. Through this procedure, “we 
get a series of concrete representations of that formal connection and the set of 
these possible representations looked upon as a unity, like the species of a genus 
[not like the parts of a whole] would display the concrete concept to our eyes” 
11844, 108]. 
By the way, M would of course be an invariant or “direct” description of the 
midpoint, a description that makes the symmetry invisible. 
Take the difference B - A of two points as another example. What is the 
geometrical meaning of this difference? To find this out, let B - A = C - D be two 
different descriptions of the same object. By applying the “symmetry operations” 
of the calculus, we get A + C = B + D. The midpoints of AC and BD thus 
coincide, and hence AB is parallel to DC. As a result we find that the difference of 
two points is a vector (or a translation). Again we may symbolize vectors directly 
and “invariantly,” using a different type of character. This time, the result of the 
construction is a completely different type of geometric entity and a new level of 
geometrical description which may exhibit new symmetries, thereby providing 
access to new aspects of reality. Grassmann has crystallized these dialectics of 
process and form into a definite hierarchical structure. 
His approach is one based on a hierarchical structure, the levels of which 
interact in a circular process. The levels of classification are the following: 
-the general theory of forms or science of symbols, which represents an 
abstract model for every mathematical theory; 
-the calculus of extension as a part of pure mathematics; 
-the intended applications of that calculus to geometry and physics. 
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In an attempt to outline the very essence of mathematics, Grassmann presents its 
most general and abstract elements, while at the same time trying to recognize an 
empirical, real element in mathematics. The above hierarchy reflects the insight 
that a theory cannot be determined through its subject matter, through the factual, 
alone. The interaction of facts and structures, which have a transcendental status 
with respect to the theory in question, enables one to develop a geometrical 
theory of physical space. Each particular theory represents a unifying process of 
the general and necessary and the particular and contingent, and “each mathemat- 
ical concept may be said to have a real and formal aspect, and the relation of these 
two aspects has to be established in order for the concept to be completed. . . . 
This is not to say such concepts are in fact completed in any absolute sense” 
[Lewis 1977, 1611, but are determined as constitutive elements of the calculus of 
extension only. 
Grassmann’s “general theory of forms” is nothing but a set of “symmetry 
principles” valid in all of mathematics and expressed by means of equations. The 
calculus of extension as a particular mathematical theory results from an interac- 
tion of both the general science of forms and the intended applications, which, for 
instance, suggest the important analogies needed to specify the axiomatic sche- 
mata. The bilinearity of the area of the quadrangle as a function of its sides, for 
instance, suggests the distributive law, and so on. 
With the evolution of physical theories, like electricity and thermodynamics, 
which were not reducible to Newtonian mechanics in a simple manner, interests in 
formal conceptions of the qualitative and in new conceptions of mathematization 
gained prominence. Mathematics applied to physics no longer plays a purely 
auxiliary role but sometimes changes the form of the theory and affects the empiri- 
cal evidence itself. Thus were the convictions of Grassmann and a similar under- 
standing, I think, is also at the heart of Maxwell’s methodology and his interest in 
a formal classification of phenomena. This interest expresses in particular the 
search for new ways of understanding questions of ontology. A quotation from 
Maxwell’s writings may therefore legitimately be used to illustrate the matter, 
although Maxwell does not directly refer to Grassmann (but to similar mathemati- 
cal ideas advanced by Hamilton): “Position and form, which were formerly sup- 
posed to be in the exclusive possession of geometers, were reduced by Descartes 
to submit to the rules advanced by arithmetic by means of that ingenious scaffold- 
ing of coordinate axes which he made the basis of his operations. ” Since this step 
was taken in mathematics, all quantities have been taken in extension only and 
treated in the same way, by means of numbers, or symbols which denote num- 
bers, so that the illusion arose that science may be advanced and carried on 
without taking into account any of the content-related ideas or phenomenological 
observations of the science. Maxwell rejects this illusion. At the same time, he 
thinks “that the progress of science, both in the way of discovery and in the way 
of diffusion, would be greatly aided if more attention were paid in a direct way to 
the classification of quantities. A most important distinction was drawn by Hamil- 
ton when he divided the quantities with which he had to do into scalar quantities 
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which were completely represented by one numerical quantity, and vectors which 
require three numerical quantities to define them” [Maxwell 1869- 1871,258-2591. 
The interesting thing is the apparent equivocation of phenomenological and 
formal perception, and the importance of the classification about which Maxwell 
speaks stands out more prominently, if we see it as being related to matters of 
ontology. We would then, for instance, not only consider vectors as shorthand 
expressions for certain triples of real numbers, but see them as formally conceived 
entities with the range of possible interpretations of the symbol remaining open 
and only implicitly given. The formal classification of quantities is thereby under- 
stood as a vehicle of exploration, rather than as a mere representation in terms of 
what is already observed. 
Since the times of Grassmann and Maxwell, knowledge has increasingly be- 
come a process whose invariant or absolute elements are of a methodological 
nature, like the principles of Grassmann’s “general theory of forms,” rather than 
referring to ultimate objects or substrata. This then results in a duality of operative 
deontologization of the concepts on the one hand, and an increasing emphasis on 
the significance of fundamental invariance principles and symmetries on the other. 
In the physical sciences, this development has only gained wide attention since 
the turn of this century, principally as a result of Einstein’s theories. 
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NOTES 
1. It should nevertheless be made clear that the (logical) “discourse” on foundational or justifica- 
tion problems of knowledge claims, which resulted in the two tiorementioned trends, were troubled 
principally by the old problem of avoiding either circularity or dogmatism. Frege’s lack of sympathy 
and understanding for the axiomatic method, because of its inherent circular connection of definition 
and predication, of foundation and development of knowledge, for instance, is well known. 
2. Evandro Agazzi, while noting that there was an opposition between the “rigor movement” and 
the “axiomatic movement” stated it, after having presented the context of these two trends in a 
manner similar to the one given here, quite contrary to the description given above. “It is perfectly 
correct, then, to assert that the conceptual development of the research on the foundations of analysis 
reached results which were dialectically opposed to that of the research on the foundations of geome- 
try. In the field of analysis, an objective interest in contents was revived, . . . whereas, in the field of 
geometry, research led to a perspective of total formalization, based on a sophisticated use of the 
axiomatic method as a pattern for all hypothetical-deductive knowledge” [Agazzi 19741. Again this 
estimation, which I consider inapplicable to the views of early 19th century, expresses an empiricist 
attitude. 
3. In the booklet “Die Formenlehre oder Mathematik” of 1872, published by Robert Grassmann 
(1815-1901), his younger brother, the term “Ausdehnungslehre” (theory of extension) is replaced by 
the term ‘ ‘AuBenlehre” (theory of the external). The only reference to objective external reality is 
made by saying that within this theory objects and relationships between objects must be distin- 
guished, as this corresponds to the situation in the outside world. 
4. Further evidence that shows how a new paradigm of scientific research arose in early 19th- 
century Germany out of a “fruitful wedding” of mathematical physics, learned primarily from the 
32 MICHAEL OTTE HM 16 
French, with a synthetic outlook derived from German Nuturphilosophie, can be found in [Caneva 
1974, (with respect to Grassmann) esp. 395-4121. 
5. J. Grassmann’s crystallographic work is also described by E. Scholz [1986, 57-641. 
6. C. F. Hindenburg (1741-1808), professor of physics and mathematics in Leipzig after 1781, 
became the founder of the so-called “combinatorial school” in Germany. The combinatorial school did 
not apply combinatorics to geometry, however. In fact within the Muthematisches WCrterbuch (math- 
ematical encyclopedia) from G. S. Kltigel of 1803, the only related entry, besides “Combination,” is 
“Combinatorische Analysis” (35 pages each). The “combinatorial school” counted Leibniz among the 
most important of their ancestors, but they claimed that Kant, through his delimitation of philosophy 
from mathematics, had demonstrated Leibniz’s endeavors to create a universal characteristic to be 
futile (see, for instance [Weingartner 1800, xiii]). Justus Grassmann seems to have been among the 
very first to apply the “Combinationslehre” to geometry again, thereby making a direct connection 
with the interests of Leibniz. Other members of the Romantic movement, such as Novalis and Schle- 
gel, considered Leibniz’s idea of a combinatorial synthesis to be the basis for the development of a 
universal “ars inveniendi,” not confined in its reference or application to mathematics and science 
[Dietzsch 19861. 
7. Grassmann writes: “The essence of the philosophical method is that it proceeds by means of 
contrasts to arrive at the particular from the general; the mathematical method, on the other hand, 
proceeds from the simplest concepts to the more complex, and thus, through the connecting of the 
particular, attains new and more general concepts. . . . 
“Since both mathematics and philosophy are sciences in the strictest sense, so must the methods in 
both have something in common which makes them thus scientific. Now, we add the scientific quality 
to a method of treatment when the reader is, on the one hand, led by it necessarily to the recognition of 
each individual truth, and is at each point of the development put in the position of seeing the direction 
of further progress on the other. . . . 
“Thus the scientific presentation in essence is an interlocking of two series of developments of 
which one consistently leads from one truth to another and makes up the essential content, while the 
other governs the process itself and determines the form. In mathematics both these series stand apart 
from each other in the sharpest way” [1844,30-32; for a full translation of this passage cf. Lewis 1977, 
131-1321. Its opening sentences are almost a repetition of Kant’s famous distinction between philoso- 
phy and mathematics. A distinction to be qualified in the sentences to follow in a manner which 
reminds one of the criticism of Kant put forward by Hegel and Schelling in their “Kritisches Journal 
der Philosophie . ” 
8. J. Dhombres has drawn my attention to a text by Galois which expresses strikingly similar views: 
“At first long algebraic computations were of little necessity for the progress of mathematics, as the 
then quite simple theorems gained little by being translated into the language of analysis. It was only 
since Euler that this shorter language became necessary to ensure the new extension given to science 
by the greatest geometers. Since Euler the computations, besides becoming increasingly necessary, 
became ever more complicated in as much as they are applied to more advanced objects of science. 
After the beginning of this century, algorithms have assumed such a degree of complexity that no 
further progress was possible without the elegance that the geometers had imported for their research. 
By means of this elegance the mind promptly and simultaneously grasps a great number of opera- 
tions. . . . I however think that simplifications produced by elegance of computation . . . have their 
limits (I have intellectual simplification in mind, for the material they do not exist). I believe that a time 
will come when the algebraic transformations, as forecast by the analyst’s speculations, will find 
neither time nor place to produce themselves. At that moment we shall have to be content to have had 
those transformations prefabricated. To come down on calculation like a ton of bricks . . . to classify 
the operations according to their difficulties and not with respect to their forms, this is in my opinion 
the mission of future geometers. . . .” [Galois 1831, 91. 
9. Take, for instance, the problem of elements (points, particles . . .) vs. relations (forces, mo- 
tions . . .). With Leibniz the concept of force “becomes a principle of almost vitaiistic activ- 
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ity. . . . He may rightly be considered as the first proponent of modem dynamism in natural science” 
[Jammer 1957, 158-1591. Grassmann also considers force to be of prime importance, “in contrast to 
the French” as he says, who reduce it to cause and effect, but conceives forces as associated with 
points at their center. In a lecture given for the “Physikalische Gesellschaft” of Stettin in November 
1864, he expresses his conviction that human minds are points, which are to be distinguished from 
other points, by the greater number of forces associated with them. 
10. Like Grassmann in his reformulation of Leibniz’s ideas, I have used small letters instead of 
capitals (as Leibniz) in presenting these examples from Leibniz’s letter to Huyghens as well as omitted 
Leibniz’s points between the letters. 
11. It seems therefore a misunderstanding to me when the editor of the German translation of 
Salmon’s Treutise on Conic Sections of 1848 claims that the invariant theoretic approach to geometry 
has fulfilled Leibniz’s ideas [Salmon 1860, viii]. 
12. In fact Leibniz’s whole metaphysics rests on the attempt to find a unit of substance that is at 
once real and indivisible and that is therefore intensional rather than extensive. These units are the 
“Monads.” Every Monad is a universal and two of them differ from one another in quality or intension 
alone, hence the principle of indiscemibles. In a letter to Jaquelot, Leibniz writes that the really 
marvelous thing lies in the fact that “every substance is a representation of the universe from its own 
point of view” [Leibniz 1875-1890 III, 464-4651. 
13. Peano has, starting with this observation, given a short and simple description 
concepts [Peano 18881; for their physical application see [Helmholtz 19031. 
of Grassmann’s 
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